China

Following a raft of ratifications this week, the Arms Trade Treaty is 4/5 of the way toward entry into force.

Paying-the-priceDepositing their instruments of ratification on Tuesday were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Jamaica, Luxembourg, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Samoa. They join 30 other countries that’ve become full members of the treaty since its adoption by the U.N. General Assembly on April 2, 2013. Ten more joinders are needed for the treaty to take effect.

In its 28 articles, the Arms Trade Treaty provides for states parties’ regulation of traffic in a range of arms, from battle tanks to light weapons. (Prior posts available here.) As indicated by the Control Arms poster above, regulating the latter is a principal aim of treaty proponents. (image credit)

Among the 5 permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (among them major arms-exporting states), Britain and France have ratified. The United States signed last September, but the treaty has not been presented to the Senate for consideration. China has not signed; Deutsche Welle reported this week:

‘China has indicated that it would consider signing if the US ratified, which is unlikely to happen.’

And in late May, the Voice of Russia reported that the Russian Federation would not sign, for the following reasons:

‘Russia considers this document to be not completely thought through. It also discriminates against the Russian military-industrial complex.’

page-06-image-UNHCR_v5.1_MapWith a hat tip to Colum Lynch of Foreign Policy, here’s the transcribed passage from today’s press briefing colloquy at which the U.S. Department of State confirmed that the United States now supports a referral of the situation in Syria to the U.N. Security Council:

QUESTION: Are you considering supporting a – UN Security Council authorizing a investigation by the ICC into war crimes in Syria?

MS. PSAKI: Ali, for you, let me check and see with her office if there’s more to convey on that. I do have something for you, Elise. One moment.

We do – the United States supports the referral to the ICC set forth in the draft resolution under discussion. We’ve long said that those responsible for atrocities in Syria must be held accountable, and we’ve been working with our Security Council colleagues on a draft resolution toward this end. We will also continue to support efforts to gather evidence to hold accountable those responsible for atrocities in Syria.

Go ahead.

QUESTION: Can you —

QUESTION: What changed your mind? I mean, originally, you had some concerns about whether this was the right venue to pursue accountability for Syrians.

MS. PSAKI: Well, obviously, we’ve remained concerned, continue to be concerned about the atrocities that we’ve been seeing on the ground. I don’t have any specific incident to point you to, just the ongoing gathering of what we’re seeing on the ground.

Reports are that the draft referral resolution – a draft that cannot take effect unless Russia and China decide to withhold vetoes – contains the same caveats that have drawn criticism with respect to Darfur and Libya. See, e.g., critiques in my articles (page 9 here, page 40 here, and pages 4, 8 here ; see too my posts here and here), as well as posts that NYU Law Professor Ryan Goodman published today, here and here. Spurring the latter was Lynch’s Wednesday scoop.

(credit for U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees October 2013 map of child refugees from Syria conflict)

OC.indd“A Point to Meet: Justice and International Criminal Law,” just published by the Asian Journal of International Law, is worth a read, given that its author is Dr. Xue Hanqin, a longtime Chinese diplomat who since 2010 has served as a Judge on the International Court of Justice. (As posted, she and the 2 other women of the ICJ, Judges Joan E. Donoghue and Julia Sebutinde, will headline the American Society of International Law Women in International Law Interest Group luncheon on April 10.)

In the just-published article, based on a 2012 speech, Judge Xue (below right; prior posts) takes on what she calls a “resurgence of legal idealism, in opposition to realism and positivism” – a resurgence evidenced by the growth of international criminal tribunals in the last 2 decades. Toward the end she states:

xue‘Justice should be placed at the centre of international law development, although as with any other topic in the field, the issue of global justice equally involves the politics of international law.’

(Many have made this point, as did I in articles here and here.) The “politics” that Judge Xue’s essay identifies have regional emphases, positioned at some odds with international criminal justice:

► “Asian efforts in socieconomic development” (a phrasing that hearkens to the longstanding “Asian values” debate) are put forward as a “broader” “vision on global justice”; that is, broader than “global justice” defined only to include criminal accountability.

► An “African practice” of ending “bloody conflicts” by means of amnesty, rather than criminal accountability.

The issues are critical, and the references invite scrutiny:

► The former reference describes a vision prevalent not just in Asia, but pretty much anywhere transitional justice is discussed. The identification of this vision with a particular region thus intrigues.

► The latter reference likewise pretermits that the “practice” of amnesty prevailed not just in Africa, but rather worldwide, through to the late-20th-C. revival of international criminal justice mechanisms. Indeed, Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II (1977) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions specifically contemplates amnesty. Exploration and critique of the history and reasons for movement away from that global practice would have enriched the discussion. The same is true for the essay’s treatment of the International Criminal Court and amnesty: A discussion (like that in this article by my former student, Gwen K. Young) of the potential to consider at least some amnesties, within the framework of the Rome Statute, would have been welcome.

NorthKoreaWeb1Children figure prominently in the parade of horribles to be found in a U.N. commission’s just-published report on North Korea.

Though sadly not surprising, this is noteworthy, not the least because the country is a charter member state of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. The report, by a commission composed of Michael Kirby of Australia, Sonja Biserko of Serbia, and Marzuki Darusman of Indonesia, demonstrates that North Korea operates far from the objective of that near-universal treaty.

By way of example, ¶ 21 of the 36-page Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, declares:

‘The State operates an all-encompassing indoctrination machine that takes root from childhood to propagate an official personality cult and to manufacture absolute obedience to the Supreme Leader (Suryong), effectively to the exclusion of any thought independent of official ideology and State propaganda. …’

(See also ¶ 81. The Report, which holds the U.N. document number A/HRC/25/63, is one of several documents released yesterday and available here.) (Credit for map © 2010 William Cornforth/Human Rights Watch, which accompanies a Human Rights Watch 2012 media release subtitled “New Testimonies Say Even Children Must Work or Face Detention Camps”)

Elsewhere the Report chronicles specific harms to children:

► Taking note of the regime’s effort to keep cities like the capital “‘pure’ and untainted,” the commission wrote at ¶ 41 (see also ¶ 89(j)):

‘[T]he large number of street children migrating clandestinely to Pyongyang and other cities – principally in search of food – are subject to arrest and forcible transfer back to their home provinces, experiencing neglect and forced institutionalization on their return.’

► The Report further observes, at ¶ 42 (see also ¶ 90(f)), that women who have fled to China and are forcibly repatriated suffer many human rights violations; for example, because of the regime’s “racist attitudes towards interracial children of Koreans,” repatriated women found to be pregnant

‘are regularly subjected to forced abortions, and babies born to repatriated women are often killed.’

► Violations persist even if the mother – who may have been trafficked to China “for the purposes of exploitation in forced marriage or concubinage, or prostitution” – remains in China. Her children, the Report explains at ¶ 42  (see also ¶ 90(e)), are among the estimated 20,000 who suffer a particular predicament:

‘These children are deprived of their rights to birth registration, nationality, education and health care because their birth cannot be registered without exposing the mother to the risk of refoulement by China.’

► As for children who live in North Korea itself, ¶ 47 of the Report states that commissioners are

‘particularly concerned about ongoing chronic malnutrition in children and its long-term effects.’

Foreign aid has not eased their plight, because (¶ 50):

‘The State denied humanitarian access to some of the most affected regions and groups, including homeless children.’

► Children were among the more than 200,000 persons from other countries whom the Report says (¶ 64; see also ¶¶ 67, 70-71) that regime subjected, over the decades since 1950, to

‘systematic abduction, denial of repatriation and subsequent enforced disappearance ….’

Having catalogued such violations in this Report and accompanying documents, the commission listed numerous recommendations. The media have focused on the recommendation for a U.N. Security Council referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court (¶¶ 87, 94(a)). Given North Korea’s nonparty status and close relation to China, a veto-holding permanent Security Council member, that seems less than a nonstarter.  But any reader of the commission’s account can only hope that policymakers will find some interim means to effect change and accountability in North Korea.

gtmoVia a flight to Slovakia, United States has relinquished custody of all Uighurs – Muslim men from western China who’d been held at Guantánamo many years after executive and judicial officials agreed the men posed no threat to national security.

It didn’t have to take so long.

‘Way back in 2008, a federal judge (interviewed today by the Miami Herald‘s Carol Rosenberg) ordered release of the men. And in spring 2009, some of these detainees came thisclose to freedom in the United States. They were to be hosted by the Uighur community in Northern Virginia. A plane was readied for their journey to the mainland. According to a May 2009 Newsweek report:

‘Then on May 1, Virginia GOP Rep. Frank Wolf got tipped off. Furious, he fired off a public letter to President Obama …. The flight never took off.’

Wolf’s stated concerns that, among other things, “the detainees might attack Chinese diplomats in D.C.,” ended the 2009 plan. Indeed, within a month, The New York Times then reported,

‘Congress overwhelmingly passed a rider to an appropriations bill for the war in Afghanistan that banned resettling any of the Guantánamo detainees in the United States …’

That stalled the release of the 22 Uighurs (now living in 6 different countries) and other detainees at GTMO (photo credit), for years. Things have picked up this year, thanks to a congressional ease-up and to work by newly appointed State and Defense envoys. But as The Times’ Charlie Savage reports today, there’s still a way to go before the camp closes:

‘There are 155 prisoners remaining at Guantánamo. Of those, about half have long been approved for transfer if security conditions can be met in the receiving country, the bulk of whom are Yemenis.’

unscMy colleague Beth Van Schaack, newly returned to academia after a stint as Deputy at the State Department’s Office of Global Criminal Justice, has posted at Just Security on what the presence of 11 International Criminal Court states parties on the U.N. Security Council could mean for ICC-Security Council relations.

In the past, states parties like Guatemala have used their seat to sponsor ICC discussions at the Council, she writes, and notes that the newest member will hold the Council presidency next month. That would be Jordan, whose Permanent Representative, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, has worked for years on ICC issues and has served as President of the ICC Assembly of States Parties. (credit for 2009 photo of Council in session)

One nagging problem for the Court has been state noncompliance with ICC orders – in particular, of arrest warrants for fugitives like Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir – and to date the Council has done little to command compliance by U.N. member states. Another, Van Schaack writes, is the Council’s withholding of sanctions against persons accused by the ICC. Yet another  is the resolution boilerplate by which the Council:

► 1st, declined to contribute funds to aid the investigation and prosecution of the Libya and Darfur situations that it referred to the Court; and

► 2d, immunized any national of a ICC nonparty states (read the United States) from ICC investigation, even if the national were suspected of committing ICC crimes in the referred situation.

(And see here.) In theory, the large presence of states parties could change these dynamics. Or not: Van Schaack writes of criticism that states “‘forget’ that they are ICC members when they are elected to the Council.”

And there is also the matter of the Council’s 4 members who are not ICC states parties, China, Rwanda, Russia, and the United States. Their attitudes toward the ICC range from ambivalent to downright hostile, and 3 of them are permanent members able to veto Council resolutions. Van Schaack indicates that this may have contributed to a “zeitgeist,” an opening for the proposal that the Council ought not veto measures aimed at stopping atrocities. As I detailed in An old new idea to break P-5 impasse, the idea’s been around for more than a decade, but gained new steam when France, a  Council permanent member, embraced it this autumn. The other P-5 ICC state party, Britain, has yet to weigh in.

p5Rather muted in the U.S. press is France’s recent call for “self-restraint” on its part and that of its veto-friendly partners in the P-5.

The P-5, of course, are the 5 countries with permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council. By U.N. Charter mandate, each of the 5 enjoys the right to veto a resolution authorizing intervention – even if the rest of the 15-member Council finds harm to international peace and security. As has been evident in the 2-plus years of Syria’s civil war, by exercising its veto a P-5 member can leave a matter run its course without international intervention no matter what the casualty count.

France has suggested a way out of this predicament. As stated in an op-ed that Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius published October 4 in Le Monde, in French, and in the International Herald-Tribune, in English, here’s the idea:

‘[T]he five permanent members of the Security Council – China, France, Russia, Britain and the United States – themselves could voluntarily regulate their right to exercise their veto. The Charter would not be amended and the change would be implemented through a mutual commitment from the permanent members. In concrete terms, if the Security Council were required to make a decision with regard to a mass crime, the permanent members would agree to suspend their right to veto.’

How to determine when the commitment is in play? It’s “simple,” Fabius wrote:

‘[A]t the request of at least 50 member states, the United Nations secretary general would be called upon to determine the nature of the crime. Once he had delivered his opinion, the code of conduct would immediately apply.’

Fabius recognized “that objections of all kinds can be made,” and sought to deflect some of them with this caveat:

‘[T]his code would exclude cases where the vital national interests of a permanent member of the Council were at stake.’

It is not a new idea. As pointed out in an October 3 lecture at Georgia Law by Lee A. Feinstein, the former U.S. Ambassador to Poland who’s teaching here this semester, a similar idea appeared as Principle 3(D) of The Responsibility to Protect, the 2001 Report of the Independent Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which launched the responsibility to protect concept.

What is new is that the show of support comes from a P-5 state itself. Yet it must be mentioned that France has vetoed far fewer times than most of its peers on the P-5. And those peers likely will be far less enamored of France’s idea, as Mark Goldberg posted at UN Dispatch.

What could draw those peers toward France’s idea? Perhaps an understanding that a P-5 member’s “vital national interests” are “at stake” whenever a resolution implicates the member’s client state. But then adoption would be hollow, for such a proviso would sap the proposal of its strength.

(credit for September 2013 U.N. photo by Mark Garten of, from left, British Foreign Secretary William Hague, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi)

Did regime-change overreach in Libya seal the awful fate that civilians have endured these last years in Syria? A new article in a Beijing-based law journal, China Legal Science, strongly argues “Yes.”

liAmong the 5 permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are 3 from the West – Britain, France, and the United States – plus China and Russia. The latter 2 countries have incurred much criticism for blocking Council action on Syria. ‘Way back in October 2011, for example, the United States’ Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Susan E. Rice, “storm[ed] out” after the latter 2 P-5 countries refused to join what she called “a watered-down resolution” against Syria. Criticism has tended to center around Russia’s commercial and geopolitical relationships with Syria. But the new article, “Responsibility to Protect: A Challenge to Chinese Traditional Diplomacy” (no. 1-2013, pp. 97-120), indicates that other concerns also have been at play. Asserts Dr. Zhu Wenqi, Professor of International Law at Renmin University (formerly a diplomat in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an attorney in the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and holder of a doctorate from the University of Paris II):

‘The Council’s failure to take action in the Syrian case is because of reflections by China and Russia upon what happened after the resolutions adopted by the Security Council in the case of Libya.’

Zhu cites Resolution 1970 (Feb. 26, 2011), which imposed certain sanctions against Libya and referred the situation to the International Criminal Court, and Resolution 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011), which authorized member states “to take all necessary measures … to protect civilians.” China voted in favor of 1970 and abstained from voting on 1973. In positing “the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect” its people, each resolution invoked the responsibility to protect doctrine. With admirable clarity and conciseness, Zhu recounts the 15-year history of that doctrine, by which:

► 1st, each state has a duty to protect its own population; and

► 2d, should a state fail in its duty, the international community has the responsibility to step in and protect the threatened population.

What happened right after adoption of Resolution 1973? NATO mounted a many-month military operation, which ended only after Libya’s longtime ruler, Muammar Gaddafi, was deposed, put on the run, and ultimately killed. The Security Council had not made regime change an explicit aim in either Resolution 1970 or Resolution 1973; a month into the intervention, however, an op-ed by the leaders of the Western P-5 members insisted that Gaddafi “must go, and go for good.” Zhu writes that this ouster effort led China to criticize the resolutions as “pretextual” and as costly in the numbers of civilians harmed.

The Libya lesson has prompted China to resist calls for intervention in Syria, Zhu states. (credit for AP photo above, captioned “Chinese Ambassador to the UN Li Baodong sitting with his hands down as Security Council members vote on resolution to back an Arab League call for Syria’s Assad to step down, Feb. 4, 2012”) What’s more, it has led China to revert to skepticism toward the doctrine of responsibility to protect. In an account that echoes writings of Judge Xue Hanqin on which I recently posted, Zhu sets out not only the value that China places on the sovereignty guarantees in Article 2(4), (7) of the U.N. Charter, but also the relation of that value to the desire to maintain independence from “‘the remnants of imperialist and colonialist oppression'” (quoting the late Wang Tieya). Quoting from this article, Zhu writes that China’s opposition to regime change in Syria is seen as reinforcing the Charter:

‘In the eyes of many Chinese evaluators, China’s attitude toward the Syrian issue actually demonstrated that China “is assuming more responsibilities and obligations” in international affairs.’

Amid this week’s reports that the United States may be backing off from demands for the resignation of Syria’s President, Bashar al-Assad, the article is timely – and its explication of the Chinese legal perspective on global security has value any time.

Sovereignty is dear to the People’s Republic of China. We international lawyers all know that. But we may have only a vague sense of why; that is, why Chinese jurists hold close to the concept of sovereignty. Nor are we likely to know what China thinks about other aspects op170f international law. I’ve just come across a few essays which provide some answers.

Each was published in the Chinese Journal of International Law by Dr. Xue Hanqin (right), on whose American Society of International Law intervention (video now available here) I recently posted. Xue wrote the articles while she was China’s ambassador to the Netherlands and, in 2 cases, a member of the International Law Commission. Today, she’s a judge on the International Court of Justice. Her status makes her take on China and international law well worth a read.

In “China’s Open Policy and International Law” (2005), and again in “Chinese Observations on International Law” (2007), Xue posited as the structural foundation  the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, agreed upon in 1954 by Burma/Myanmar, China, India, and Indonesia. As she described them, the 5 are:

  1. “mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity”;
  2. “mutual non-aggression”;
  3. “non-intervention in international affairs”;
  4. “equality and mutual benefit”; and
  5. “peaceful-coexistence.”

Xue wrote that China values sovereignty from the perspective of its history – a history marked by decades of invasion and occupation, which came to an end only in the mid-20th C. “I must say frankly,” she wrote in 2005:

‘[T]he first introduction of international law into China from the western world in the late 19th century left the Chinese people with little fond memories, as it was done through cannons and warships.’

cjil(Regarding this history, she referred to the 1990 Hague Academy lectures by the Professor Wang Tieya.) In her 2007 article, Xue situated China within the “viewpoint of the developing countries,” that “international law is based on a foreign legacy.” By this view, the U.N. Charter won acceptance because it enshrined “certain values” that postcolonial states “had been fighting for: sovereignty, equality, democracy, and self-determination.” She argued that the international legal system depends on “diversity of autonomous political communities,” and would falter if all members were forced to adhere to “one single social model.” She expressed concern lest the concept of responsibility to protect become a vehicle for usurping “multilateral mechanisms” for determining whether states may intervene against another. And even as she repeated China’s statements in support of “a just, impartial and effective” International Criminal Court, Xue argued, in the name of sovereignty, against ICC exercise of its Article 12(2) nonconsensual jurisdiction. (My own exploration of that provision is here.)

The 2 essays, along with “International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System” (2009), which Xue coauthored with Jin Qian, demonstrate the extent to which China has embraced such cooperation. (No doubt this theme is further developed in Xue’s own Hague Academy lecture, published here in 2012.) The country has entered more than 300 multilateral treaties, the vast majority since 1979.  And through a complex process that is neither entirely monist nor entirely dualist, it has implemented treaty obligations domestically – with respect to its World Trade Organization accession alone, China altered nearly 3,000 domestic laws and regulations.

China’s human rights record is, of course, an easy target for outside criticism. Yet Xue’s articles indicate that the framework for compliance is there: China has ratified thematic human rights treaties, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, as well as comprehensive treaties like the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights – none of which the United States has ratified. (The countries switched sides on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with the United States a party and China a nonparty.) Xue further emphasized a 2005 amendment to China’s Constitution, by which Article 33 now provides:

‘The state respects and guarantees human rights.’

Xue acknowledged the growing participation of nongovernmental organizations and other nonstate actors. Indeed, she pointed out that she herself once introduced delegates at a U.N. conference on desertification “our peasants,” whom she’d brought as “grass-roots representatives” of the problem. Yet Xue questioned whether their presence had “changed the basis of decision-making”; in her view, “national interests remain a determining factor for international cooperation.”

China_revisedforState_480_1On these and other critical topics – law in the South China Sea, for instance, or climate change –  reading these 3 essays will help the Westerner contemplate the international legal system from the standpoint of the world’s most populous state.

whitehouse7apr13lgMemorable bits ’n’ pieces from the just-concluded annual meeting of the American Society of International Law:

► Comments by Dr. Xue Hanqin, who has been a law professor and government official in China and, since 2010, a judge on the International Court of Justice. For a taste of the incisive observations she made during the closing plenary on “Global Governance, State Sovereignty, and the Future of International Law,” consider her opening remark after moderator José Alvarez (NYU Law) introduced the other panelists, Bruno Simma (Michigan Law/Munich Law) and Joel Trachtman (Tufts/Fletcher), then her. I paraphase:

‘I see this panel is “The West – And the Rest.'”

►The emphasis placed on fundamental fairness during a dialogue between Fatou Bensouda, International Criminal Court Prosecutor, and Judge Theodor Meron, President both of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals. (Video of their Brookings appearance, also last week, is here.) Asked at ASIL about recent acquittals at the ICC and ICTY, as well as the latter’s counterpart for Rwanda, both stressed that accountability is to be equated not with conviction, but rather with the subjecting of charged crimes to a fair process of adjudication of individual criminal liability – a process that accepts the possibility that some individuals will not be found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. (Yours truly made similar points in this 2002 AJIL essay on a 2001 ICTY decision.)

CAREpaket_frei3_01Bruno Simma recalling a day in 1945 or 1946. A 5-year-old boy who had just lived through the end of World War II, he saw a CARE package fall from the sky and into the village in Austria where he lived. In it were watercolors and marbles. They became his only toys. The package, stamped U.S.A., marked his 1st memory of the United States of America. (Simma went on to become a distinguished law professor, 1st in Austria and then in Germany and the United States, as well as a judge on the International Court of Justice. He is now a member of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, and received ASIL’s Hudson Medal at the annual meeting.)

► A discussion of “The Past & Future of African International Law Scholarship.” I was lucky enough to catch parts of a couple presentations at this panel. Erika George (Utah Law) offered a thoughtful review of From Cape Town to Kabul: Rethinking Strategies for Pursuing Women’s Human Rights, the super new book by Albany Law Dean Penny Andrews. A imagesreview of international economic law books by Uche Ewelukwa-Ofodile (Arkansas Law) underscored that notwithstanding all the troubles covered in mainstream media, Africa is on the rise. (Kudos to moderator/organizer James Gathii, whose Loyola Law class I’d had the pleasure of leading earlier in the week.)

► Not the least by any stretch, the reunion of IntLawGrrls, members of ASIL’s Women in International Law Interest Group, and assorted male friends at Thursday’s luncheon, where I delivered my talk on “International Law and the Future of Peace.” Present in the sold-out room, in addition to our life-size cardboard cutout of proto-foremother Eleanor Roosevelt, were so many women and men – I cannot name them all. Women who have inspired my lifework, like judges Patricia Wald and Joan Donoghue and prosecutor Fatou Bensouda; dear colleagues, like Betsy Andersen, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, and Beth Van Schaack, not to mention Andrea Bjorklund and Karima Bennoune from my former home, California-Davis Law, as well as Laura Kagel, Harlan Cohen, and Charlie Hunnicutt from my current home, Georgia Law; present and former students, like Kate Doty, Kelly Wegel, Kaitlin Ball, Sonia Farber, and Caroline Arbaugh; and the Addis Ababa University Law lecturer and 5 students comprising Ethiopia’s 1st all-woman Jessup team. My thanks to all who were able to attend or sent their regards. Thanks too, of course, to WILIG, which has just launched a mentoring program that generated much excitement among the young international lawyers present.

► After the meeting ended, I headed to the National Gallery of Art (the Dürer exhibit and the Matisse cutout room are must-sees; the pre-Raphaelites, not so much). Standing at a corner monwhere we pedestrians had a good view of the 555-foot-tall marble obelisk known as the Washington Monument, a wee boy asked his father an excellent, and perhaps unanswerable, question:

‘Why did we built that?’